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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, and Utah Code Anno. 78-2-3(j)(1988) and Rule 5 Utah R. App. 
P. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellee, Toby Gottling (Gottling), believes the issue in 
this case is more properly stated: "Does a former employee state 
a cause of action under Utah law against an employer, employing 
less than fifteen employees, when she alleges she was terminated 
for refusing to continue a sexual relationship with her 
supervisor?" 
This issue was resolved in favor of Gottling on a cross 
motions for summary judgment by the trial court. Review of a 
trial court's grant of summary judgment is a determination of 
whether the trial court correctly applied governing law, 
affording no deference to the trial court's determination or 
conclusions of law. Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen Med. Clinic, 
2000 UT 18, 1[4, 994 P.2d 1261. 
Appellants suggest that there are additional issues, which 
they list as issues three and four in their brief, both dealing 
with the personal liability of Peterson. However, the order from 
which they appeal makes clear that the trial court did not rule 
on those issues but instead they were "... reserved for decision 
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until after plaintiff has taken discovery," [record at 318, %3] . 
Despite the fact that the trial court did not rule for or against 
them Appellants have addressed the personal liability of Peterson 
in both their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and their Brief 
on Appeal. Presumably this is because they believe they are 
appealing the trial court's failure to grant them the relief they 
sought. Accordingly, Gottling has briefed the issues pertaining 
to this issue and leaves it to the court to determine whether 
this issue is actually before it. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen Med. Clinic, 2000 UT 18, 994 
P.2d 1261 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) 
Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) 42 USC §2000e 
UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt; 
UT Exec Order June 30, 1989 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order July 17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; 
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UT Exec Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Gottling brought suit after she was fired by the appellants. 
Gottling alleged she was terminated because she refused to 
continue a sexual relationship with Peterson, the owner of 
Carbmaster and her supervisor. At the time Gottling was 
terminated, Appellants employed fewer than 15 employees. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Gottling filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination 
in violation of a clear and substantial public policy after she 
was fired when she refused to continue a sexual relationship with 
Appellant Kelly Peterson (Peterson). Peterson is the owner of 
Appellant Carbmaster (Carbmaster) and was Gottling's supervisor 
at Carbmaster. 
After Gottling filed suit Appellants answered. Gottling 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that 
Appellants defenses of pre-emption by the Utah Anti-
Discriminatior+ Act (UADA) and failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies were invalid. Appellees filed their own Motion for 
Summary Judgment arguing that the UADA pre-empted the claim. 
Gottling moved to amend her complaint based upon evidence 
Appellants had provided that Carbmaster was a dba of a 
3 
corporation. In that amendment Gottling added additional legal 
bases for her public policy wrongful termination claim. 
The court heard the cross motions for summary judgment and 
ruled against Appellants and in favor of Gottling on the pre-
emption issue. The court reserved ruling on the motions for 
summary judgment on Peterson's personal liability until discovery 
was completed. The ruling on pre-emption was based upon 
Gottling's second amended complaint which is currently the 
operative complaint in the file. Appellants received permission 
to file an interlocutory appeal and the matter moved to this 
court. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court correctly ruled that Gottling's complaint 
states a cause of action against Carbmaster when it granted 
Gottling's motion for partial summary judgment and denied 
Appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Gottling sued Appellants alleging that she was terminated 
because of her sex in violation of public policy because she 
refused to have sex with Peterson, [record at 2, 300]. 
Appellants answered and asserted two affirmative defenses 
relevant to this action. M. Plaintiff's claims are pre-empted 
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act" and "5. There has been a 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies." [record at 9, 329]. 
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Gottling had actually anticipated a motion to dismiss rather than 
an answer. Gottling then filed a motion for summary judgment and 
asked the court to strike Appellants' fourth defense, that 
Gottling's claims were pre-empted by the UADA, and their fifth 
defense, that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies, 
[record at 17]. Appellants' motion for summary judgment asked 
the court for an order "... declaring as a matter of law ... 
Gottling has failed to establish the existence of the new tort 
plaintiff asks the court in this lawsuit to recognize." [record 
at 72] . The trial court then decided the purely legal issues 
which may be reduced to the question, does Gottling's complaint 
state a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy? The trial court issued its memorandum decision 
holding that the Utah Civil Rights Act and the numerous Executive 
Orders of the governors of the state of Utah established a public 
policy against termination based on state law and that Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act also established such a public policy. 
[record at 291] The court then entered the order which Appellants 
have appealed, [record at 317] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, and 
Executive Orders of Utah Governors provide a clear and 
substantial public policy against termination of an employee in 
Utah because of sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
5 
as amended, and other federal statutes and regulations also 
provide such a public policy. 
Because a claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy is a tort Peterson's actions were tortious. The 
fact that he arguably took those actions in his position as an 
officer of Carbmaster does not shield him from personal liability 
from that tort. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER UTAH LAW 
A. 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
The trial court's memorandum decision cited the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, as a Utah statute 
establishing a clear and substantial public policy against 
terminating a person on account of their sex. That section of 
the act is entitled "policy and purposes of act" and provides; 
It is hereby declared that the practice of 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin in business 
establishments or places of public accommodation or in 
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the 
health, safety, and general welfare of this state and 
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination in 
business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, 
violates the public policy of this state. It is the 
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purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and 
equal availability of all goods, services and 
facilities offered by business establishments and 
places of public accommodation and enterprises 
regulated by the state without discrimination because 
of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national 
origin. The rules of common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof shall be strictly construed has no 
application to this act. This act shall be liberally 
construed with a view to promote the policy and 
purposes of the act and to promote justice. The 
remedies provided herein shall not be exclusive but 
shall be in addition to any other remedies available at 
law or equity. 
Contrary to Appellants' suggestion, there is nothing in the 
Civil Rights Act to suggest that its provisions or its policy do 
not apply to employment. The act itself provides: "[t]his act 
shall be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy 
and purposes of the act and to promote justice. The remedies 
provided herein shall not be exclusive but shall be in addition 
to any other remedies available at law or equity." In other 
words, the Act sets the policy for the state and anticipates 
other types of actions being brought in reliance upon that 
policy. It is exactly this type of policy this court envisioned 
when it defined the general parameters of claims for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy in Peterson v. 
Browning. This court has already held that the policy of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act intends that it be construed as broadly as 
possible to combat discrimination. Beynon v. St. George-Dixie 
Lodge #1743, 854 P.2d 513 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 
869, 114 S. Ct. 195, 126 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1993). 
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Appellants' argument misconstrues the holding of Peterson v. 
Browning. They would require that Gottling sue under the Act in 
order for the public policy of the Utah Civil Rights Act to 
apply. They are in error. The public policy is only declared by 
the act. Gottling need not sue Appellants under the Act to have 
that policy apply any more than Mr. Peterson was required to sue 
Browning Arms under the Utah and Missouri tax codes or federal 
customs law. All Peterson required was that the plaintiff 
identify the source of the public policy, not that she sue under 
it. 
Similarly, Appellants' argument that Gottling may make use 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act only as a customer is flawed. The 
policy established by the act is clear. Sexual discrimination is 
pernicious to the "general welfare of this state and its 
inhabitants." Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1. Inhabitants, not just 
customers. 
B. 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE GOVERNORS' EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Gottling provided the trial court copies of ten Executive 
Orders issued by Utah's current and past governors. Recent 
Republican and Democratic governors issued Executive Orders 
stating that public policy in Utah deplores sexual harassment and 
sexual discrimination. Appellants argue that the Executive Orders 
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may not be the source of public policy because Executive Orders 
may not legislate. Again they miss the point. Appellants have 
not been sued under the Executive Orders. They have been sued 
under the theory of Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
1992) . 
Each of the cited Executive Orders recites the evils of sex 
discrimination and/or harassment in its preamble. A preamble is 
"an introductory statement in a constitution, statute, or other 
document explaining the document's basis and objective." Blacks 
Law Dictionary 1194 (7th ed. 1999). The objective of each of 
these Executive Orders is to denounce sex discrimination and 
harassment and then to exercise as much authority as the Governor 
has to eradicate it. The fact that Governors are not entitled to 
enact statutes eliminating sex discrimination, or any other 
statute for that matter, does not mean that they have not 
enunciated the policy of the state against it. Compare Governor 
Leavitt's statement in the Executive Order of March 17, 1993; 
"... the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity 
of the workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal 
standards of acceptable behavior." [record at 44]. Clearly this 
does not refer only to government employees. [Emphasis added.] 
In his Executive Order of March 17, 1993 Governor Leavitt 
further directed, "by the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and laws of this state, [I] do hereby prohibit 
9 
sexual harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any 
and every workplace in which state employees and employees of 
public and higher education are required to conduct business." 
[Emphasis added.] Obviously state employees of agencies like the 
Workers Compensation Division of the Utah Labor Commission1, the 
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Administration2, and Work 
Force Services3, and other entities are required to conduct 
business in every business of the state. Appellants' business is 
covered by the March 17, 1993 Executive Order. 
Similarly, Governor Bangerter's Executive Order of July 25, 
1986; "to judge an individual, expressly or through implication, 
by his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, 
age or handicap, is repugnant to every American ideal and a 
distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth." 
Governor Bangerter then identified the breadth of that policy. 
"It is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote 
the right of all persons to find employment where their 
individual capacities lead them." [Emphasis added.] id. 
Governor Bangerter's Executive Order of July 25, 1986 
further provides; 
HJtah Code Anno. 34A-2-802 
2Utah Code Anno. 34A-6-104 
3Utah Code Anno. 35A-1-104 
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. . . the basic rights of all the people of bhis nation 
are the rights to seek a livelihood, opportunity for 
advancement and the respect of our society based solely 
on the individual's ability and capacity. To judge an 
individual, expressly or through implication, by 
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every American 
ideal and a distortion of our standards of human 
freedom and worth. [Emphasis added.] 
Clearly Governor Bangerter did not believe that the public policy 
of the state of Utah limited basic employment rights to those 
women employed by large employers. 
Governors Leavitt, Bangerter, Matheson, and Rampton would 
all have been very surprised to learn that they did not have the 
power to set public policy for the state of Utah. It is clear 
from Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Utah that 
the governor h^s the power to make public policy. "... the 
office of governor is political, ... the discretion vested in the 
chief executive by the constitution and laws of the state 
respecting hiSj official duties is not subject to control or 
review by the courts and ... his proclamations, warrants and 
orders made in the discharge of his official duties are as much 
due process of law as the judgment of a court." 3 8 Am.Jur.2d, 
Governor §10. Governors may set the public policy of the state 
through their executive orders. The public policy of the state 
of Utah, for at least the last 35 years, has been against sexual 
harassment and discrimination. A termination in violation of 
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that policy is a wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy. 
That Executive Orders are among the varieties of law which 
this and other courts will look to for public policy in analyzing 
a wrongful termination may be seen by the opinion in Burton. 
There this court compared Dr. Burton's position to the law 
established by the Maryland court in Molesworth v. Brandon and 
distinguished it because in Molesworth the plaintiff had relied 
upon a Maryland Executive Order in addition to statutes. 
C 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST SEXUAL 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER UTAH CODE ANNO. 76-10-1302 
The operative complaint in this matter is the Second Amended 
Complaint which the Appellants have answered, [record at 299, 
327]. At paragraph 13 of that complaint Gottling alleged that 
Utah Code Anno. 76-10-13 02 forms the basis for a public policy 
wrongful termination claim. 
Utah Code Anno. 76-10-1302(a) provides that a person is 
guilty of prostitution when he engages in any sexual activity 
with another person for a fee. Gottling alleged that she was 
fired when she refused to continue a sexual relationship with 
Peterson. Peterson was demanding that she provide him sexual 
favors in exchange for her job. This variety of consideration is 
clearly covered by Utah Code Anno. 76-10-1302 (a) . 
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The public policy of this statute is public and intended to 
benefit society more than individuals. It meets all of the 
requirements of Peterson v. Browning to form the basis for a 
claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. In 
the unlikely event the court determines that the broader policy 
Gottling urges should be found in the Utah Civil Rights Act and 
in the Governors' Executive Orders do not apply, Gottling, 
nonetheless, states a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
II 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
It was clear that federal statutes may state public policy 
from this court's first clarification of public policy wrongful 
termination claims in Peterson v. Browning, at 1283. There the 
court said; *Although many state and federal laws will reflect 
Utah public policy and may, in fact provide a source of Utah 
public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between 
the law violated and the public policies of Utah. That has been 
done here." There Peterson sued because he was fired for 
refusing to falsify federal customs documents. 
That this court does not reject a public policy claim out of 
hand merely because it is predicated on federal lawr may also be 
seen from its analysis in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 3 95, 4 06 (Utah 1998). There the court spent more than two 
13 
full pages analyzing Ryan's claim that his termination had 
violated the public policy found in sections of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. If federal law could not form the basis for 
a public policy wrongful termination claim the court would have 
merely told Ryan that federal law cannot provide a basis for a 
wrongful termination claim and dismissed him out of hand. 
A 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Utah's policy is to prohibit discrimination within the 
State, not merely to prohibit discrimination among employers with 
more than 15 employees. Other states have examined this same 
issue in light of anti-discrimination acts, which also have 
jurisdictional limits based on the number of employees, and held 
that discrimination statutes do describe clear and substantial 
public policy. See Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990); 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996); Kerrigan v. 
Magnum Entertainment Inc., 804 F.Supp. 733 (D.Md. 1992); Collins 
v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995); Roberts v. Dudley, 993 
P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000); Williamson v. Greene, 490 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va. 
1997) . 
Retherford provides the analysis for the inquiry as to 
whether a public policy is clear and substantial. Retherford at 
note 9. 
14 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently 
"clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine 
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and 
substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As 
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all 
statements made in a statute are not expressions of public 
policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between 
private individuals or "'impose requirements whose 
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy 
concerns.*" [Citations omitted.] 
The following questions are relevant to determining 
whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial public 
policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question 
is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed 
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the 
public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and 
weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that 
parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal 
bargaining power. 
These two questions are both answered affirmatively in the case 
of sex discrimination. 
The policy prohibiting sex discrimination is one of 
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties 
only. The Policy against age discrimination is clear and 
substantial on numbers alone. There are more than 11 million 
people employed by employers with too few employees to be covered 
by the Act, Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 114 
S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, (1994) Note 6. Congress felt so 
strongly about sex discrimination that it directed the Attorney 
General of the United States to file suit to enforce Title VII 42 
U.S.C. § 2000^-6. It also imposed punitive damages as a penalty 
against employers who violate that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
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The scope of the problem is no different in Utah. 69.7% of 
Utah's employees work for employers employing 14 or fewer 
employees. Burton at 1(25, note 2. 
The fact that Title VII has jurisdictional requirements 
based on the number of employees does not mean the public policy 
is merely to prohibit discrimination by those employers with 15 
or more employees. That argument was rejected by the court in 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 P.2d 608 (Md. 1996). There the court 
examined a wrongful termination claim brought by another woman 
who claimed she was terminated because of her sex by an employer 
with fewer than the required number of employees. The Molesworth 
court noted that the legislative history of Title VII indicated 
that the reason for the 15 employee requirement for cases 
submitted to EEOC was that including all employers would create a 
significant backlog for EEOC, Id. at 614. 
Title VII reflects a clear and substantial public policy 
against discrimination based on sex. 
1 
BURTON DOES NOT APPLY TO TITLE VII 
In Burton v. Exam Center, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT 18 
(Utah 2000) this court examined the plaintiff's age 
discrimination case under the UADA and determined held that 
statute did not provide a clear and substantial public policy 
against age discrimination. There the court specifically said 
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its decision d^d not preclude an examination of other statutes to 
determine whether there was a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex, r^ce, religious or disability discrimination. 
Burton at 2000 UT 18 fl7. The court's major emphasis was on the 
UADA's simplified and expedited resolution procedure. 
In this matter Gottling asks the court to hold that a clear 
and substantial public policy against termination on the basis of 
sex in Utah is found in the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Utah 
Governors' Executive Orders, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (as amended) as well as in other federal law. The Burton 
analysis does not apply to this case. While sex discrimination 
claims brought under Title VII are investigated by the Utah Anti-
Discrimination and Labor Division (UALD), they, unlike UADA 
claims, are not heard in the UALD venue. If a negotiated 
resolution is not reached within the UALD a Notice of Right to 
Sue is issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and the claimant may then become a plaintiff in a law suit 
brought in state or federal court. In short, a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim does not have the benefit of the expedited 
administrative procedures a UADA claim does and the Burton 
analysis does not apply to Title VII claims. Further, the 
legislative history of Title VII shows that the purpose for 
excluding small employers was to reduce the case load of the EEOC 
and not to provide some alternative to litigation as the court 
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found in Burton. In short, the Burton analysis does not apply to 
Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and substantial public 
policy against termination because of sex. 
B 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER OTHER FEDERAL LAW 
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the 
clear and substantial public policy against termination because 
of sex. At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination 
in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of 
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It goes without saying that if 
an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it 
cannot discriminate in whether to pay any compensation at all, 
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex. 
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer, 
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain 
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid. If clear and 
substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among 
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the 
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman 
relies for her livelihood. 
Specific regulations of the federal government show a clear 
and substantial public policy against sex discrimination, 
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regardless of tlfie size of the employer. Businesses who contract 
with the Federal Railroad Administration4, the Federal Highway 
Administration5, the Federal Communications Commission6 
specifically, afid the government generally7 may not discriminate 
based on sex no matter how few employees they have. In analyzing 
regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson v. 
Browning, did not create a cause of action for the violation of 
individual statutes or regulations. It merely held that the 
statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their 
policy is clear and substantial. If there is a clear and 
substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small 
firms who contract with the federal government to perform 
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial 
against sex discrimination by small firms who contract with the 
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial 
services. If there is a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex discrimination by small firms who perform janitorial 
services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex 
discrimination by small firms who do anything else. 
449 CFR §265.7(a) (1) (i) 
523 CFR §2.30.113 
647 CFR §73.2080 
741 CFR §^0-1.4 
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For many years neither congress nor the President of the 
United States were prohibited in any fashion from discriminating 
against their employees on the basis of sex. As of 1996 both of 
these employers are required to treat women employees no 
differently than they treat men, including in firing decisions. 
See 2 U.S.C. §1311, 3 U.S.C. §411. When both of these employers 
who have previously been able to do as they wish are now 
restricted in their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it 
is clear that the national public policy is clearly and 
substantially against allowing an employer, of any size, to fire 
a woman because of her sex. 
Ill 
GOTTLING'S CLAIMS ARE NOT PRE-EMPTED 
The trial court examined the purely legal issue of whether 
Gottling's termination, as alleged, stated a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. There was no dispute 
that at all relevant times Carbmaster had fewer than 15 
employees. The trial court held that these facts do state a 
cause of action upon which relief may be granted. 
Gottling's claim would have been pre-empted and she would 
have been allowed to proceed with her sex discrimination claim 
under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, UCA 34A-5-101 et seq. or 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if Carbmaster had 15 or 
more employees. Since Carbmaster had fewer than 15 employees it 
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is not an "employer" under the UADA.8 Because Carbmaster is not 
an "employer," Gottling is not an "employee" under the Act. 
Because the parties are not "employers" or "employees" under the 
Act, there is rio jurisdiction for either to seek relief or to be 
required to respond to claims raised under the Act and the UADA 
does not pre-empt Gottling's claims. 
Appellants argued that the UADA pre-empts Gottling's claims 
and relied on the analysis of Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P.2d 949 
(Utah 1992). Actually reading Retherford shows why the UADA does 
not pre-empt Gottling's claims. To pre-empt a claim, a statute 
must offer alternative relief. The UADA offers no relief to 
Gottling. Retherford analyzes both Utah and Federal statutes in 
its pre-emption discussion. 
In Retherford, at 968-969, the court analyzed the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) which pre-empts various labor 
claims because those claims may be addressed undei: collective 
bargaining agreements. 
The justification for this expansive view of section 
3 01 preemption is the ease with which an aggrieved 
employee otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or 
contract claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding 
that might result in an inconsistent interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. 
8The term "'employee' means any person applying with or 
employed by an employer." Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102(6). The 
term "'employer' means . . . every . . . person employing 15 or 
more employee^ within the state . . .." Utah Code Ann. §34a-5-
102 (7) . 
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That pre-emption is justified because the employee has relief 
available under a collective bargaining agreement. Other Federal 
statutes may pre-empt other types of claims when relief is 
available under those statutes. 
Retherford also addressed pre-emption by Utah state 
statutes. At 965, the court discussed pre-emption under the 
Worker's Compensation Act. The key to whether there was pre-
emption was u. . . that the Workers' Compensation Act provided 
the exclusive remedy . . ." Id. [Emphasis added.] The Workers' 
Compensation Act pre-empts claims of injured workers when it 
provides a remedy for those claims through an administrative 
process. 
Finally, Retherford discussed pre-emption by the UADA. In 
Retherford, the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the UADA 
pre-empted all discrimination claims as the trial court suggests. 
Instead it said xx. . .we conclude that taken as a whole, the 
version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing 
defined retaliation as discrimination and provided the exclusive 
remedy for this type of discrimination." Id. at 962. [Emphasis 
added.] As with both the LMRA and the Workers' Compensation Act, 
the UADA pre-empts those claims for which it provides remedies to 
claimants. 
Other courts have used this same analysis in holding that 
statutes like the UADA do not pre-empt discrimination claims 
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against small employers. In Kramer v. Windsor Park Nursing Home, 
Inc., 943 F. Supp. 844, (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court applied 
Collins v. Rizk\ana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) which acknowledged 
the type of caujse of action Gottling filed. The Kramer court 
responded to the pre-emption argument there, ". . . despite 
O.R.C.§4112, the plaintiff in Collins had no adequate remedy 
since her empldyer was exempt from coverage by the statute. 
[Citation omitted.] The court did not believe that the 
legislature meant for small business to have a 'license to 
sexually haras$/discriminate against their employees with 
impunity.'" 
Because Carbmaster is not an "employer" and because Gottling 
is not an "employee" under the UADA, that Act provides Gottling 
no remedy. Because the Act provides no remedy, it does not pre-
empt her wrongful termination claim. 
IV 
PETERSON IS PERSONALLY LIABLE IN TORT 
In Utah, the wrongful termination of an employee in 
violation of piublic policy is a tort. Peterson v. Browning, at 
1284. Appellees don't dispute that Gottling was terminated by 
Peterson. A cjorporate officer, an agent, is not shielded from 
liability for a tort committed on behalf of her principal, the 
corporation. 
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Utah courts have cited with approval the Restatement 
(Second) Agency,5 and American Jurisprudence, Second, on Agency,10 
and Corporations11. Each of these respected treatises describes 
the law which makes Peterson liable for her tortious actions in 
illegally terminating Gottling. 
The Restatement: 
343. General Rule 
An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not re-
lieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the 
command of the principal or on account of the prin-
cipal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the 
principal, or a privilege held by him for the 
protection of the principal's interests, or where the 
principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of 
care to the person harmed. Restatement (Second) Agency, 
§343. 
The Restatement, again: 
344. Liability for Directed Conduct or Consequences 
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for 
his own personal conduct, for the consequences of 
another's conduct which results from his directions if, 
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the 
conduct, or its consequences, except where the agent or 
the one acting has a privilege or immunity not 
available to the other. Restatement (Second) Agency, 
§344. 
American Jurisprudence, Second: 
9Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998) 
10Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996) 
^SII Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Super abrasives Corp., 
969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998) 
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. . . an qmployee who tortuously causes injury to a 
third person may be held personally liable to that 
person regardless of whether he or she committed the 
tort while acting within the scope of employment, 
because of the employee's liability is based on 
personal wrongdoing independent of the employment 
relationship." 27 Am.Jur. 2d, Employment Relations, 
§488. 
American Jurisprudence, Second, again: 
If . . . q. director or officer commits or participates 
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also 
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third 
persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what 
liabilityjattaches to the corporation for the tort. A 
contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a 
corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape 
liability behind the shield of his representative 
character, even thought the corporation might be 
insolvent |or irresponsible. 18B Am.Jur. 2d, 
Corporations, §1877 
The treatise law is that Peterson is liable for her tort in 
wrongfully firing Gottling. 
Other counts have likewise found corporate officers liable 
in situations similar to that before the court. In Dillon v. 
AFBIC Development Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1979) the 
individual was held liable under the Federal Fair Housing Act 
where he made factual misrepresentations while acting in his 
capacity as vice president of the corporate defendant. In Tash 
v. Houston, 74 Mich. App. 566, 524 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1977) summary 
judgment for the individual defendants was denied in a tortious 
interference with contract case where the individual was acting 
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on behalf a union. In Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal.App. 4th 1318, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 315 (1996) the court declined to dismiss 
claims against a corporate representative who personally 
discriminated against an employee under the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act. 
V 
THE ORDER IS NOT FLAWED 
Appellants argue that the court's order is flawed in that it 
exceeds the breadth of the memorandum decision. If Appellants 
were correct and some disharmony between the two documents 
existed it is the order which would prevail. Morgan V. Morgan, 
854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. 
Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943). 
Notwithstanding Appellants' confusion there does not appear 
to be a conflict between the Order [record at 318] and the 
Memorandum Decision [record at 291]. Appellants' complaint, 
according to their brief at 47-48, is that the Order disposes of 
the issue of Peterson's personal liability. Gottling's reading 
of paragraph three of the Order is that "Defendant's Motion fo 
Summary Judgment on the personal liability of defendant Kelly 
Peterson is reserved for decision until after plaintiff has taken 
discovery." This very issue was discussed by the court in oral 
argument on February 20, 2 001. There at page 28 line 23 through 
page 29 line 22 the court suggested that it was going to reserve 
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ruling on Peterson's liability. Language to that effect was 
placed in the proposed order and then for clarity, interlineated 
by the court. Clearly, the trial court reserved the issue of 
Peterson's liability until later. 
CONCLUSION 
Toby Gottling was fired because of her sex. There is a 
clear and substantial public policy against that firing found in 
the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Governors' Executive Orders, Title 
VII and other federal statutes. This court should deny 
Appellants' appeal and send the matter back for trial on the 
merits. 
DATED this ^ J day of ^^0^/1^^-! 2001. 
ROBERT H. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
1. Memorandum Decision 
2. Order 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT <p£ UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
TOBY GOTTLING, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
KELLY PETERSON, dba Carbmaster, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 000210087 
Judge Michael K Burton 
There are several motions pending before the court.1 Plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment and Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment are dispositive of 
certain prominent issues and the Court will address motions first and then move on to the 
remaining motions. 
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court "view[s] the facts and all 
reasonable inferences draWn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." K & 
T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). Because both parties are moving for 
summary judgment, each motion must be evaluated separately, drawing all inferences in favor of 
1 — 
1
 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint; 
4) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion; 
5) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order; and 
6) Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Plaintiff. 
the non-moving party. 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment seeks to eliminate four of the 
Defendant's affirmative defenses which are: 1) That the Defendant is not the real party in interest 
because plaintiff was employed by P.R. Incorporated, LLC, not Kelly Peterson personally; 
2) That because the Plaintiff was employed by a corporation, Defendant Kelly Peterson is not 
personally liable for Plaintiffs wrongful termination; 3) That the Plaintiffs claims are preempted 
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA); and 4) That the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies under the UADA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, on the 
other hand, seeks prevail on three of its affirmative defenses: 1) That the Plaintiffs cause of 
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is preempted by the UADA; 2) That 
there is no clear and substantial public policy against firing an employee under the circumstances 
of this case; and 3) That Kelly Peterson cannot be personally liable for the wrongful termination 
of the Plaintiff because PR., Inc. and not Mr. Peterson was Plaintiffs employer. The Court will 
address each issue in turn. 
Defendant urges that there is no support in Utah law for Plaintiffs cause of action for 
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Defendant further argues that Burton v. 
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (2000), precludes Plaintiffs claim on the basis that it is 
preempted by the UADA. The Court disagrees with Defendant's contentions. 
There is ample case law in Utah supporting a cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy. See generally, Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) Most recently the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Burton v. 
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he 
-o c* n 
was discriminated agajnst on the basis of his age and was fired for that reason. He sued his 
employer for terminating his employment in violation of a public policy against age 
discrimination. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
An at-will employee may overcome that presumption be demonstrating that (1) 
there is an impjied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated 
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another agree-upon condition; (2) a statute 
or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under 
certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of 
a clear and substantial public policy, [citations omitted] In that case, we further 
remarked that not every employment termination that has the effect of violating 
some public policy is actionable: "a public policy whose contravention is 
achieved by an employment termination must be 'clear and substantial' to be 
actionable." Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and 
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions of public policy. 
Id, at 1263 (quoting Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). 
In Burton, the plaintiff relied solely on the UADA to establish a clear and substantial 
public policy against age discrimination. The Court was not persuaded that the UADA alone 
established a clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination with respect to small 
employers (i.e. employees with less than fifteen employees). The Court stated, 
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination 
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement of 
policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional provision 
bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exists no 'fundamental 
policy' which precludes age discrimination by a small employer. 
Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). However, the Court also specifically limited its decision to 
claims of age discrimination, stating, "Suffice it to say that sex, race, religion, and disability may 
present different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those grounds 
might conceivably be found in other statues of this state. That question is not before us and we 
express no opinion on that subject." Id. 
Separate and apait from the UADA, the Utah Civil Rights Act also prohibits 
*-} C^ "u 
discrimination based on sex, but notably, leaves out any mention of age discrimination.2 Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000). Additionally, the plaintiff has cited ten executive orders from 
governors of the State of Utah, including our current governor, all forbidding the practice of 
sexual harassment in every workplace in which state employees are required to conduct business. 
Finally, plaintiff has cited to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et. seq. as evidence of an overriding federal 
public policy against sexual discrimination. In light of these statements of public policy from 
the Utah legislature, the Utah executive branch, and Congress, this Court is persuaded that there 
is a clear and substantial public policy forbidding discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the 
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy 
The remaining issue is whether the Plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the UADA. There 
is no controlling authority on this issue, and therefore, the Court will borrow from the reasoning 
of another jurisdiction. In Molesworth v. Randall 672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996), the 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland's version of the Anti-Discrimination Act did not 
preempt a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee by an employer 
with less than fifteen employees. The Maryland Court reasoned that it would be improper to 
assume that the legislature meant to insulate employers with less than fifteen employees from the 
2
 It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in 
business establishments or places of public accommodation or in 
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and 
general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; and that such 
discrimination in business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the 
public policy of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000) (emphasis added.) 
state public policy against discrimination based on sex. Rather, a more accurate interpretation of 
the legislature's intent was that the exception for employers with less than fifteen employees was 
a means to avoid overburdening the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the Act. 
The Court correctly pointed out that, had the legislature intended to protect small employers from 
common law wrongful discharge, it could have included small employees in the Act and thus 
preempted the field of employment discrimination entirely. 
Similarly, in Utah, our state legislature could have preempted the field of employment 
discrimination, but choise not to. It would be inequitable to find that there is a clear public policy 
against discrimination on the basis of sex, but that small employers are granted a license to 
discriminate and their epiployees have no recourse available to them. Therefore, the Court finds 
that the UADA does noi preempt Plaintiffs common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment is granted with respect to affirmative defenses four and five. 
The remaining issue raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment is 
whether the Defendant can be held personally liable for the wrongful termination alleged by the 
Plaintiff, or whether Plaintiff must name the corporate employer P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The 
Court will hold off reaching a decision on that issue for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff has 
sought leave to amend her complaint to name PR., Inc. as a defendant. The Court will grant 
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint should she choose to do so. However, the Court will not 
issue an advisory opinion as to whether Mr. Peterson would be personally liable while plaintiffs 
motion to amend her complaint is pending. 
Second, Plaintiff has filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking the Court to refrain from ruling on 
the issue of Mr. Peterson's liability until she has had an opportunity to take his deposition. 
Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Peterson did not maintain the corporate formalities separating 
himself from P.R., Inc. The Plaintiff is entitled to discover whether the interests and ownership 
of the corporation were such that they justify piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, PlaintifFs 
Rule 56(f) motion is granted. 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of the Plaintiff are denied. 
Dated this / / day of J $ ^ r 2 Q 0 1 
/ 
Michael K. Burtoij f./ 
District Court Judge <A 
ROBERT H. WILDE #3466 * I $ jK 
RUSSELL A. DENTON #8903
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
INI AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TOBY GOTTLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
KELLY PETERSON DBA CARBMASTER, 
D^fendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 000210087 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
ooOoo 
This matter came on regularly before the court on the 20TH day of 
March, 2001 at the hour of 1:30 a.m. for consideration of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, Plaintiff's Rule 
56(f) Motion, Defendant's Motion for Protective order, Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Affidavit and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The 
plaintiff was represented by Robert H. Wilde. Defendant was 
represented by Bradley Tilt. The Court having reviewed the memoranda 
filed, listened to the argument of counsel and having reviewed the 
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affidavits filed in support thereof, having written and filed a 
Memorandum Decision and having good cause appearing therefore: 
NOW THEREFORE IT HEREBY ORDERED that; 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted 
for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision 
describing the court's reasoning that a clear and substantial public 
policy against discrimination based on sex exists in Utah which 
supports a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy, 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of 
whether or not a cause of action exists for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy based on sexual discrimination is denied 
for the reasons reflected in paragraph one, 
3. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the personal 
liability of defendant Kelly Peterson is denied without prejudice and 
(A^N+O \^ti may be rcf iBpgcf after plaintiff has taken discovery, 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted. 
Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint shall be the operative 
complaint herein, 
5. Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion is granted, 
6. Defendant's Motion for Protective Order is denied, and 
7. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of plaintiff is 
denied. 
Dated t h is US day of r 2ocri<v^ 
Michael fc. %tixton —"*",.<«? 
D i s t r i c t Cpu£fc"*ijad^cP 
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